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The inlandAbstract This paper examines the applicability of the Zomia concept for social scientific studies of
the Malaysian region, with a focus on the Malaysian port cities, including Melaka. While for both
empirical and socio-cultural reasons the term Zomia itself may not be entirely appropriate to the
Malaysian Melaka region, the analytical implications that are based on James C. Scott’s usage
of it, particularly the emphasis on the cultural dynamics of inter-ethnic, inter-national, and inter-
religious relations of port areas, can be of great utility to those working in the Malaysian region.
Zomia is a neologism gaining popularity with the publication of James C. Scott’s provocative book,
The art of not being governed: an anarchist history of upland Southeast Asia. The term of Zomia is
designed to indicate the people who has not been governed by the nation-state and national regime.
 2016 Publishing services by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Institution for Marine and Island Cultures,
Mokpo National University. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction: rethinking maritime frontiers
Malaysian port cities as open frontiers have been well-known
for ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity, providing rich
materials for the study of social dynamism though the power
of nation-building processes transformed them into national
territories, reconfiguring regional and transnational connec-
tions across maritime frontiers. In this chapter, I examine the
history and culture of Melaka (Malacca in English), certainly
representing Malaysian port cities, with a focus on its role con-
necting the ocean and the inland in the East Asian maritime
world and the characteristics and meanings of interactions.Recently scholars (e.g. Andaya (2001, 2008), van Schendel
(2002), Scott (2009)) have paid attention to Southeast Asian
frontiers, standing on the monumental study of earlier scholars
such as Den Hollander (1960, 1961), Leach (1960) and
Lattimore (1947) on Asian and European frontiers. It is nota-
ble that the recent attention of frontiers has centered on
Zomia, upland Southeast Asia, largely thanks to the publica-
tion of Scott’s book, The Art of Not Being Governed (2009).
Indeed Scott’s idea of Zomia comes from Willem van Schen-
del. van Schendel (2002: 665) calls scholars’ attention to border
areas that are systematically missed by conventional
approaches of area studies to ‘‘to break out of the chrysalis
of the area dispensation which occurred after World War II,
and to develop new concepts of regional space”. In this regard,sity.
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has been invisible in scholarship. The rather arbitrary division
into four different world areas (Northeast Asia, Southeast
Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia) has blocked scholars from
communicating across these divides. He proposes the study of
Zomia as a way to challenge some of the biases of area studies
(2002: 653–654). Responding to van Schendel’s proposal,
James Scott provides a new look at historical and cultural
dynamics in a vast area of the Southeast Asian hinterlands
and inlands with a particular focus on deliberate state-
avoidance.
Now it is observable that Zomia as a concept metaphor
defines social reality in a way that it describes (cf. Sahlins
(1981)). Concept metaphors, such as gender or the French
Revolution, ‘‘facilitate comparison, frame contexts, levels or
domains within which data – however defined – can be com-
pared for similarities and differences” (Moore, 2004: 75–76).
If there is a general agreement on the defining features of a
concept metaphor, it serves as paradigmatic to a particular
approach on reality. Similarly, area studies use a geographical
metaphor to visualize and naturalize particular social spaces as
well as a particular scale of analysis. They produce not only
specific geographies of knowing but also create geographies
of ignorance (van Schendel, 2002). The term of Zomia, which
is becoming influential, itself may inherently shape our histor-
ical and social imagination in particular directions. In this
regard, Zomia as a concept metaphor can be both a promise
and a problem.
Juxtaposing Scott’s case with two other definitions of
Zomia- one is that Zomia as a concept metaphor can be a pro-
mise, and the other is that Zomia as a concept metaphor can be
a problem, I call attention to the way where concept meta-
phors define social landscapes and historical dynamics. Draw-
ing on the work of several Asian area specialists, I suggest a
model of ocean-inland relations that does not privilege either
a community or the state as a dominant player of society
and history. The economic, political, and social formation of
Zomia represents a strategic adaptation to avoid incorporation
in state structure (Scott, 2009: 39). Zomia as a ‘‘non-state”
space is characterized by zones of refuge and by ‘‘escape”
forms of agriculture and social life though it is currently being
erased by the nation-state’s incorporation powers (Scott, 2009:
23, 127, 187, 324–325, cited in Jonsson (2010): 192).
Upland Southeast Asia, locus of Zomia, has been resistant
to control by lowland nation-states. But this relative resilience
has been due to their marginality. A lot of ethnic spaces within
the upland Southeast Asian region belong to geographically
dispersed and politically fragmented minority populations
(Turner, 2010: 121). Over the years, however, the zones of
political and cultural resistance were transformed into the
zones of economic development with the intervention of the
state (Nyiri, 2012: 533–562).
Is it possible to apply the notion of Zomia to the explana-
tion of the social formations of maritime or watery frontier
societies in Southeast Asia including Malaysia? I argue that
it can have relevancy in dealing with maritime or watery fron-
tier societies which have experienced the historical and social
dynamics of multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural forma-
tions. Port cities have represented maritime frontiers and con-
nected the ocean and the inland. Here Melaka as a
conspicuous port city has been a hub of waterly frontier soci-
eties. The concept of Zomia is debatable one. As I mentionedabove, Zomia as a concept metaphor can be both a promise
and a problem. I think that Zomia as a concept metaphor
can be a problem rather than a promise.
From this point of view on Scott’s concept of Zomia, I do
explain and (re)interpret the history and culture of Melaka in
connection with the ocean and the inland in the East Asian
maritime with the notion of ’watery Zomia’ or ’waterly fron-
tier’. This explanation and (re)interpretation addresses that
the different patterns or types of migration were prevalent in
the maritime world before European invasion and this flow
linked ethnicity and urbanism (Hall, 2006: 454).
In my opinion, by examining the widespread patterns of
sojourners and inhabitants moving across the maritime world,
it is emphasized that the development of urbanism rested on
shifting population, not on the static settlements of people in
one place at one time. In this regard, I argue that it is impor-
tant to focus on the social formations and transformations of
cultural mosaics or of sojourners and inhabitants as their ways
of lives. It is fact that Scott provides a new perspective on the
concept of frontier and Zomia. And Scott regards the concept
of frontier and Zomia as the terminology of deliberate state-
avoidance. However, there are similarities and differences
between Scott’s terminology of frontier and the terminology
of waterly frontier or waterly Zomia concept. From this criti-
cal point of view, I emphasize that the concept of waterly
Zomia has close relationship with the concept of verandah
or window to have connection to the ocean and the inland in
maritime world. In Southeast Asian maritime world, seaports
like Melaka as a bridge of maritime networks, had an impor-
tant role to connect with the ocean and the inland. In this
regard, the concept of waterly frontier is different from Scott’s
concept of Zomia or frontier as the area of deliberate state-
avoidance. Therefore, I emphasize that it should be under-
stood that the concept of waterly frontier is different from
the concept of Zomia, based upon Scott’s Southeast Asian
studies, focused on the inland Southeast Asian areas. I argue
that waterly frontier has been not only an open space to
exchange multiple cultures and histories, but also a zone of
state-avoidance in Southeast Asian maritime world.
In this sense, it is necessary that Scott’s critique of Zomia
can be connected to the case of Melaka port city.
The East Asian maritime world and the formation of port cities
as maritime frontiers
The East Asian maritime world consisting of inlands, islands,
seas and oceans stretches across many countries and diverse
ethnic groups. It has been central in cultural and commercial
networks in the world. Connecting the region and the rest of
the world, it has accommodated multiracial, multi-ethnic, mul-
ticultural, multi-religious communities. In this sense, cultural
pluralism and dynamism have been deep inside the East Asian
maritime world.
Over history, the sea has been intertwined with human soci-
eties and their relations. Individual East Asian islands devel-
oped networks with other islands and among them particular
islands functioned as hubs for collection and distribution in
the networks. The islands maintained autonomy which is an
inherent nature of their societies. Together with islands, the
sea was connected to coastal commercial cities and migrant
cities. Combining commerce and migration, this maritime
world actively formed urban networks.
30 S.-J. HongInterrelationships and linkages between the inland and the
ocean were pivotal in the formation of diverse networks in the
maritime world. Long-distance networks activated commercial
relations or migration processes. Using the networks, sover-
eign authorities had access to commerce, occupying port cities
as key control points. Despite the occupation, the trade and
migration networks were not disconnected from inland areas.
Rather, it opened new opportunities to extend their political
and cultural influence to the open sea. At all events, the East
Asian maritime world has been a cultural, religious, and com-
mercial meeting place. Above all, its port cities have mediated
various places. From a historical perspective, they functioned
as veranda or window paving a way to a broader world. It
was through port cities that commercial and cultural interac-
tions took place in the East Asian maritime world.
Religious and cultural inflows from foreign countries were
blended with indigenous cultural forms and this mix-up in turn
created a vigorous cosmopolitanism in the East Asian mar-
itime world. The rulers of East Asian kingdoms had a keen
interest in establishing its presence in pursuit of commercial
opportunities with foreign countries. These kingdoms’ politi-
cal, economic, and cultural power rested on port cities that
had commercial relations with foreign merchants, drawing sig-
nificant revenue from taxes on commerce. They gave a special
treatment to foreign merchants while attempting to restrict
wealthy indigenous elite class. Foreign merchants were encour-
aged to keep associating their business with their mother coun-
tries not only because they facilitated cultural, commercial
relations but also because their accumulation of wealth bene-
fited the rulers. Foreigners even became appointed as officers
to collect customs and taxes and also keep social order in port
cities. However, they were restricted to higher positions which
were occupied by kingdoms’ noble classes.
After the 17th century, Chinese merchants began to be
dominant this area and subsequently took up the role of mid-
dlemen. In 1517, when Spanish colonialists fortified Manila,
there were few Chinese traders. Until the late of 16th century,
Manila was the center of the East Asian maritime world. From
Fujian province, especially Xiamen, Chinese silk and ceramic
were carried to Manila and then to Mexico. Spanish galleons
transported such items to Acapulco in Mexico and Venice
(Venezia) in Europe. Silver in East Asia was also transported
to European markets via the Manila-Acapulco-Venezia sea
road. Chinese ships too rode in this route and carried silver
from Mexico back to their mother country. In 1775, the
amount of silver flowing in China from Mexico surpassed that
of Japanese silver. Chinese merchants played a role in connect-
ing European markets with East Asian colonial port cities con-
structed by European people. Silver reached colonial port
cities through Chinese ships (Tagliacozzo, 2004: 23–25).
Equal to Manila, Melaka’ position and role cannot be
stressed too much in the formation of the East Asian maritime
world. One of the most important goods that Melaka mediated
between the East and the West was spice. In the age of discov-
ery, though it is difficult to trace its origin, the expeditions of
Spain, Portugal and England were increasingly dispatched to
look for spice. From the early 16th century to the first half
of 19th century, they more safely assured economic interest
and acquired a significant amount of profit by exclusively con-
trolling spice. They took advantage of existing hierarchy and
prestige and exploited indigenous people in pursuit of wealth.By the late 19th century, they strengthened their position and
substantially colonized the areas.
In 1511, Portugal occupied the capital of Melaka Sultanate
and advanced to many islands of the Malay world including
Maluku which used to be the original production area of spice.
With the fall of Melaka, Melaka Sultanate’s capital moved to
Johor and newly established the kingdom of Johor. However,
since the latter part of the 17th century, its power had dramat-
ically weakened and by the 18th century, most of the sultan
kingdoms like Melaka became extinct.
As European powers began to strengthen their position,
they attempted to place the sea under their control. In the
15th century, before Portugal fleets passed the Indian Ocean,
maritime defensive zones did not exist in port cities while in
continental areas, in order to defend the attacks of nomadic
people or territorial states, defensive zones were established.
Unlike them, the Indian Ocean, though under the influence
of Islam, was not the exclusive Islam sea but open and shared
by many people. However, European powers such as Portugal,
Netherlands and England built strong maritime traffic for-
tresses and set up artillery in order to control sea paths by
force. They also dispatched warships and patrolled the sea
which was turning into an exclusive and monopolized space.
European power transformed the Indian Ocean.
The maritime world stretching from the Indian Ocean to
South China Sea developed a highly interconnected network.
Here, diverse people scattered but connected, practicing various
religions and languages whilemaintaining social order centering
on port cities. During the period from the 15th century to the
17th century, the Kingdom of Ryukyu emerged and engaged
in mediating between the Indian Ocean and the islands of Japan
and Korea. It is existing commercial networks of the Indian
Ocean where European powers rode into advance into Asia.
In particular, both the Islamic world and the maritime
world shared common networks. Islamic networks expanded
towards the East and became connected with Indian Ocean
maritime networks. The networks were based in relationships
among various groups of people. Meanwhile, each group’s
position was firmly secured on the grounds of fiduciary rela-
tionships acknowledged by other groups. In another word,
they had to cultivate an equal, mutual and complementary
‘‘contractual relationship” and observe it. Besides, in the devel-
opment of the networks, the Indian Ocean world acted as a
meeting place that brought together environmental, biological,
natural, human, and cultural differences in East Asia.
Generally speaking, the water unites and the land divides
(Sutherland, 2007: 27, 55–56). But ‘‘land and sea were linked
by interlocking webs of collecting centres, markets, entrepots
and feeder routes” (Sutherland, 2007: 31). In this sense, it
can be said that geography is destiny (Sutherland, 2007: 55).
My visit to Melaka in 2007 and 2008 affirmed the story. The
city of Melaka are located on a narrow coastal plain formed
by the Melaka river and small streams, and separated from
the districts to the north and south by coastal mountains that
sweep down to the Straits of Melaka and the Indian Ocean.
The development of Melaka as port city rested on these geo-
graphical features that connect the ocean and the inland mixed
with narrow river valleys and mountainous lands. This topog-
raphy that is formed by narrow river valleys, coastal plains,
lagoons, and a few broad deltas is common in large parts of
Southeast Asia and southern China.
The social formation and cultural identity of Southeast Asian frontier society 31Water heavily influenced the life and outlooks of coastal
peoples, fostering a maritime-oriented culture and a geograph-
ical worldview that is associated with trans-national and trans-
regional history and connections. This orientation toward seas
and rivers has led some historians to refer to a ‘‘water fron-
tier,” a single region stretching from southern China to both
coasts of the Malay Peninsula and Java Sea in connection with
the Straits of Melaka, a part of the maritime ‘‘Silk Road” of
the Indian Ocean (Andaya, 2001, 2008; Emmerson, 1980;
Hall, 1985; Lockard, 2010; Sutherland, 2007; Tagliacozzo,
2004). Hence, it can be seen as one long maritime avenue, with
diverse sub-branches, that transcends political and national
boundaries.
From this angle, Southeast Asia including the Straits of
Melaka and the Malay Archipelago, the Indian Ocean, and
southern China, linked by the seas and the ocean, became part
of the full canvas of interaction as well as of a cohesive trade
network that also came to include the Sulu, the Philippines,
the Ryukyu Islands, East China Sea, Yellow Sea, Japanese
islands, and Korean islands, and so on.
On the other hand, the East Asian maritime world had one
dominant political and economic power, China, which had
connections with numerous smaller states. This huge but polit-
ically fragmented and often sparsely populated region around
‘‘a sea common to all” (Lockard, 2010: 219) spawned fluid eth-
nicities, dynamic transnational economic zones, and flexible
political boundaries while waterborne commerce that was
facilitated by the string of ports was an essential component
in the making of the region. This interactive canvas also linked
mainland Southeast Asia with maritime Southeast Asia in a
myriad of exchanges. In the water frontier, many people trav-
eled as often by boat as by land, and quite a few relied on mar-
itime trade, smuggling, raiding, or piracy for their survival.
Fishing peoples of southern China made their living in a
close attachment to the sea. The same was true of many peo-
ples of Southeast Asia, including Malays and Javanese. Some
scholars refer to the coastal peoples as ‘‘littoral societies”.
Their locations and porous frontiers acted as filters. Aquacul-
ture where the salt of the sea meets the silt of the land was the
norm (Lockard, 2010: 221).
It was not just water but also ‘‘seafarers” or ‘‘sea people”,
including seafaring traders that linked the distant shores.
The maritime traders congregated in ports, linking the hinter-
land to the wider world. Places that were blessed with good
location, usable harbors, adequate warehouse facilities, and
ample supplies of food and water became seaport cities,
super-centers for trade. These port cities were not necessarily
final destinations but mostly mediating points in an ever-
changing political and economic environment. Port centers in
Asia, especially Southeast Asia, comprised ethnically and cul-
turally diverse communities, and allowed officials of foreign
birth or ancestry, who knew the cultures and languages of
the foreign merchants, to supervise the trade. These ports fos-
tered not just economic but also cultural exchange.
The geographical condition of the East Asian maritime
world has promoted interactions between the sea and the
inland through trade and market exchange. There have been
a number of merchants, traders, and seafarers in port cities
and their surroundings. The East Asian maritime world has
a diverse connection, linking the islands in the Indian Ocean,
the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea. It has served
as a sea route.In particular three questions draw our attention when it
comes to the construction of the East Asian maritime world
encompassing coastal areas and their hinterland surroundings.
The multi-cultural areas were shaped through the long period
of interconnections and what can be called the ‘‘East Asian
Maritime Silk Road” emerged. The first is how the formation
of the East Asian maritime world was meaningful in the histor-
ical point of view. The second is how the people who have been
relying on the East Asian maritime world have marked their
presence in this region. The third is what the implications of
its historical construction in the present time are.
The East Asian maritime world encompasses the history
and culture of port cities that connected between the ocean
and the inland. It divides into many nation-states, regions,
and areas. Also it consists of small and simple societies and
diverse ethnic groups. The East Asian sea as an agency pro-
vided a spot for human and material interactions and
network-making. It has promoted multi-lingual, multi-ethnic,
multi-religious, and multi-cultural communities. The pluralism
of the East Asian maritime world has been a fundamental fea-
ture and generated cultural dynamics.
Never being self-reliant, the islands in the East Asian sea
have established an extensive network with other islands.
The sea has been mingled with various human groups and
developed complex relations. In this network, port cities have
been focal points of collection and distribution of goods and
services from the ocean and the inland.
Meanwhile, from the maritime cultural point of view, we
can also say that the islands have retained their autonomy
and own forms of life styles that are distinct from the outer
world, to a certain extent. However, apart from the islands,
the maritime world accumulated its revenues and resources
through commerce and trade in port cities. In this sense, we
can say that the islands of the maritime world have been more
active and dynamic than land-locked cities controlled by king-
doms and nation-states.
The deepening of interrelationship between the sea and the
inland has promoted a widespread network that has encom-
passed many islands, seas, and port cities across the region.
We can search for such a long distant network model devel-
oped by trade or commerce relations and various types of
migration. Sovereign authorities built up themselves, riding
on this maritime network and centering on port cities. Port
cities were considered as key points in the making of polities.
Trade and migration networks in the maritime world did not
exclude land-based governance. They extensively carried cul-
tural features of port cities into inland areas. Along with the
networks, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religious, and
multi-cultural dynamics were widespread across the region.
The main function of port cities was to invigorate trade and
commerce across political boundaries through maritime net-
works. It has been difficult for land-based kingdoms and
nation-states to dominate maritime commerce. Central pow-
ers, in their attempt to expand influence, even adopted policies
that promoted the flexible utilization of maritime networks.
There has been an interrelationship between the ocean
including islands and seas, and the inland including both high-
lands and lowlands. Bargaining, colliding and interactions
have surely taken place in the everyday lives of people such
as traders, merchants, migrants, islanders, fishermen, and sea-
farers. It is obvious that port cities as maritime frontiers
accommodated different types of social systems and structures.
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cial meeting places over history. Maritime frontier societies
have been in connection with the outer world through net-
works encompassing the sea and the inland. Port cities served
as outlets through which the two geographical domains imag-
ined, projected, and encountered each other. They were
exposed to the global flow of goods while building up relations
with the outer world.Melaka’s history and culture in the context of the East Asian
maritime world
The basis for the formation of the East Asian maritime net-
work was relationships that various actors had built up. Mean-
while, individual interest was stably secured, based on strategic
relationship acknowledged by counterparts. In another words,
they had to cultivate an equal, mutual, complementary and
contractual relationship which they had to obverse. Network
expansion relied on this type of relationship.
The Indian Ocean world has promoted a cultural exchange
across the East Asian maritime world, bringing together envi-
ronmental, biological, natural, and cultural differences and
similarities. It is notable that trading networks in the Indian
Ocean during the era of 1300–1500 has drawn a significant
attention from scholars of cultural history (Andaya, 2001,
2008; Reid, 1988; Tagliacozzo, 2004). They pay an attention
less to the exchange of products than to the membership of
trading communities, the relationships among merchant com-
munities, and regional cultural and economic consequences.
What draws our particular attention is that this sub-region
of the international East–West maritime route took on free-
flowing maritime trade and cultural identities immediately
prior to the Portuguese seizure of Melaka in 1511. It is neces-
sary to note an alternative understanding of regional trade
requires maritime diasporas and other networked relation-
ships. In doing so we can focus on networking between sec-
ondary and primary centers one of which was Melaka as a
port city and deepen our knowledge on early urbanization in
the East Asian maritime world (cf. Hall (2008)).
The geographical and historical condition of Melaka pro-
vided a significant source for the formation and transforma-
tion of human and material networks. The culture of
peoples’ lives in Melaka was underpinned by such a geographic
condition that was in connection with the East Asian maritime
world. From a historical perspective, Melaka has been one of
the most important key links among the Straits of Melaka, the
South China Sea, the Java Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Paci-
fic. What has made Melaka conspicuous is that it has con-
nected between the ocean and the inland in the Straits of
Melaka, the Malay Peninsula and their surroundings. It pro-
vides a road to the Indian Ocean. The East Asian maritime
world consists of three major components: the sea, the ports,
and the inland with coastal areas. Although the components
are different in types of geographical conditions, they became
interconnected areas and formed parts of the maritime ‘‘Silk
Road” or the ‘‘East Asian Sea Silk Road”.
It is well explored that people living along the fringes of the
nation-state assert a sense of cultural distinctiveness in a polit-
ical environment marked by social and economic inequality
(Johnson, 2011). It has been a famous story that Melaka is
the historical root of Malaysian cultural heritage or Malaysianculture itself. Melaka has been well-known as a distinctive
place where visitors should visit to delve into the essence of
Malaysian culture. However, Melaka is not only a center for
cultural heritage but also embraces a core icon of modern
Malaysian identity (Watson, 1996).
It is notable that Melaka had a special and significant status
in the formation process of the East Asian maritime world.
One of the most important goods Melaka dealt with was spice.
From the early 16th century to the first half of the 19th cen-
tury, in the East Asian maritime world, Spain and Portugal
exclusively controlled spice trade and by doing so more stably
secured their economic interest and achieved significant profit.
Taking advantage of existing hierarchy and prestige, they
exploited indigenous people in this area. European colonial
dominance in the early 16th century in the East Asian mar-
itime world was substantially different from that in the late
19th century.
Melaka is not just the city where Malay culture originated.
It was the first city in the Malay Peninsula where Chinese
began to settle down and cultural hybridity deeply took root.
It is the main reason that Melaka should be considered in
the context of Malaysian cultural diversity, complexity, and
hybridity. Ever since Melaka was officially named ’bandar
bersejara dan berbudaya’ (historic and cultural city) according
to the Malaysian government in 1992, it has represented
Malaysian culture and history (State Government of Melaka
1992). Like other areas in Malaysia, Melaka preserves the
characteristics of multi-ethnic society. In Melaka, urban cul-
ture formed by the mix-up of various lingual and ethnic groups
including Malays, Chinese, Indians, indigenous people, and
European descendants has been deeply marked. In spite of
the spread and influence of Islam among the Malays, Melaka
accommodates multi-religions such as Islam, Taoism,
Hinduism, Christianity, and so on.
The 15th century sultanate of Melaka came to represent the
ancestral state of what is known as Peninsular Malaysia today.
It tended to be distinct from other pre-colonial states that
spanned the Straits of Melaka where Melaka was intimately
linked throughout history. Thus, it came to serve, much as
Majapahit did for Indonesia, as a geographical forerunner of
the modern Malaysian state (Reid, 1979). However, Melaka’s
heritage and its foundation associated with Sumatra became
omitted since the Malaysian state has shown little interest in
the Srivijayan past or in archeological work that cannot be clo-
sely identified with a ’Malay’ ethnicity (Andaya, 2001; Reid,
2001).
During the period from the early 16th century to the 17th
century, Melaka was an international commercial port. At that
time, a variety of commercial exchanges and trading activities
among diverse groups took place in Melaka to the extent that
84 kinds of languages were spoken (The Suma Oriental of
Pires, 2005). It is evident that Melaka witnessed dynamic cul-
tural exchanges or interactions among people.
It is interesting to discover how Melaka came to represent
the ethnic heritage and relations. It is apparent that in the rep-
resentation, the Malay population is celebrated and the
Portuguese are hybridized, while the Indians and Chinese,
despite their historical importance in the city, are largely
ignored, although recently there have been attempts to include
other legacies and acclaim a more cosmopolitan Malaysian
identity. Whose heritage represents Melaka is contentious.
Melaka is represented in Malaysia’s tourist and heritage
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This slogan came out in the context of the cultural policies of
the Malaysian state in the 1970s and 1980s when the political
and religious traditions of the pre-colonial Melakan Sultanate,
colonial rule and the modern Malaysian state were con-
structed. The emphasis on ethnic Malay heritage naturalized
that of other Melakan inhabitants such as the Portuguese
Eurasians and the Peranakans, and ignored that of the major-
ity, the Chinese immigrants of later periods. Malaysian cul-
tural representation in the 1990s was shifted to a
modernizing, multi-ethnic nation in which a feudal past plays
a lesser role.
The cultural and ethnic diversity of Melaka reminds us that
the dynamics of cultural and political fields of Southeast Asia
problematize any overall application of terms like ’shatterbelt’.
Melaka was never shattered with cultural, religious and ethnic
differences. Rather, it accommodated them and became a mul-
ticultural, cosmopolitan hot spot. In this openness, it func-
tioned as a maritime frontier for the outer world. It was an
evident stronghold for a number of merchants and commercial
immigrants over history. As a cosmopolitan trading port city
Melaka connected the sea world with the inland area by pro-
moting diverse and complex maritime activities. It played a
central role in forming the East Asian maritime world. Melaka
as one of the most famous international port cities in South-
east Asia had systematic relationships with other port cities
and functioned as a center in maritime networks linking to
the various inland kingdoms. It also acted as a cultural broker
and mediated between the ocean and the inland. Performing
this role, Melaka became marked with cultural hybridity and
mixed identity.
Meanwhile, Malaysian tourism documents suggest visitors
to go to Melaka to know the historical roots of Malaysia.
My research on Melaka particularly engages in that point.
Melaka symbolizes not just the result of cultural heritage mar-
keting. It also significantly embodies a constructed core icon of
modern Malaysia identity.
As mentioned above, Melaka had experienced Western
colonialism for 300 years since its colonization from the
Portuguese invasion in 1511. After Portuguese and Dutch
invasion, Melaka came to be under British colonial rule.
Western colonial policy played a vital role in forming multieth-
nic society in Melaka. Under the influence of Western colonial
rules, Melaka was a general meeting place for Islam of Malay
people, Buddhism and Taoism of Chinese people, and
Hinduism of Tamil people. The characteristics and meanings
of Melaka culture were formed and transformed, going
through the processes of adopting or rejecting various types
of culture and religion under Western colonial control.
The best place to show cultural hybridity and ethnic mosaic
is ’Jongker Street’ or ’Harmony Street’ in another name. Here,
Hindu temples and Buddhist temples coexisted in a very close
distance. This is a symbolic place for showing the combination
and harmony of ethnic groups represented by Malays, Indians,
and Chinese. It says that Masjid Kampung Kling in the Street
is the representative of religious lives in East Asia; it is the old-
est temple in Melaka. Kampung means ’village’ in Malays.
Kling had meant Indian Muslims who migrated from India
to Malay world in the past, and later it became a common
name for early Islamic believers.
In the center of the mosque, there is a fountain where
believers wash their hands and feet as well as other parts oftheir bodies before worshipping. It is a place for purification.
A lot of Masjids have been built so that Muslims can have
more space and opportunities for their religious activities.
They symbolize Islamic prestige, and reflect Muslims’ religious
piety and influence.
An investigation into family backgrounds tells that people
who controlled the port city tended to mobilize their own polit-
ical authority and economic wealth and establish an overarch-
ing order across various groups of people. The formation of
Melaka as a trade center represents the prosperity of Islam
in the East Asian maritime world. Even though Muslim mer-
chants began to communicate with East Asia around the end
of the 7th century, it might be said that the conversion of local
leaders after the 13th century as a result of the efforts of
Muslim merchants across the Indian Ocean played a great role
in the spread and prosperity of Islam. Records left regarding
interactions between local monarchs and Muslim merchants
reaching the Strait of Malacca passing through the Indian
Ocean indicate that Islam began to be accepted from the end
of 13 century (Tagliacozzo, 2004: 25–26). The sea road from
Arab and Indian port cities to the Strait of Malacca provided
an outlet for the merchants to conduct their long-distance
trade based on common contractual principles that in turn
contributed a lot to the proliferation of commercial activities.
There is a Hindu temple on the left side of Masjid
Kampung Kling. The Hindu temple was built for indigenous
people who migrated from Tamil areas in southern India to
Melaka to maintain their own religious ritual and customs.
Worshippers burn incense towards the temple everyday and
make their wishes to various Hindu deities. The Tamil who
had migrated from Tamil Nadu area in southern India have
also adapted to local culture while their own form of cultural
tradition have been retained. They established themselves as
one of the major ethnic groups in Melaka, identifying them-
selves as Malaysian Indians.
Chinese people who had migrated to the Malay Peninsula
settled down and constructed Malaysian Chinese society.
Mostly coming from Fujian province in southern China, they
formed the oldest Chinese society in Malaysia. Their history
traces back to the 15th century when Melaka as the largest
port city in the Strait of Malacca boosted maritime commerce.
The first Chinese society was formed in the northeast part of
Melaka where the oldest Chinese artifacts in Malaysia were
found. The hill called Bukit Cina in the area that has been used
as a Chinese graveyard evidences the presence of the Chinese.
Qing Yun Ting (or Cheng Hoon Teng) temple is one of typ-
ical Chinese temples in Melaka. On the roof of the temple are
sculpted various images appearing in Chinese myths. Worship-
pers burn paper money and incense in the center of the temple.
The temple accommodates various deities of folklore and other
religions as well, for instance Guan Yu(觀音) and Bodhisattva.
It evidently tells us that Taoism and Buddhism became mixed
and that syncretism characterizes the belief systems of
Malaysian Chinese.
As seen, the coexistence of the temples of Buddhism, Islam
and Hinduism in Harmony Street also reveals this syncretism.
The construction of ethnicity and culture was based on it.
Melaka accommodated various cultures and produced cultural
hybridity. Apart from cultural mix-up represented by Baba-
Nyonya in Chinese society, Chitty culture symbolizes localized
Indian people, Islam accommodates Malay cultural practices
and European culture became hybrid.
34 S.-J. HongMelaka was a strategic locale that created hybrid forms of
cultures by the accommodation of migration flows and hetero-
geneous cultures. In doing so, Melaka became a cultural hot
spot where various ethnic groups made full use of the social
environment and were willing to join the formation of cultural
hybridity. This process of creating cultural hybridity is domi-
nant part of Melaka’s history.
It is undeniable that Melaka is the best example of cultural
hybridity in Malaysia, as evident from the presence of the
groups of Baba Cina and Peranakan who settled down and
have lived there since a long time ago when Melaka used to
be a colony. In their culture, Chinese and Malay cultural ele-
ments were well mixed-up and transformed into a distinct cul-
tural form. European descendents who inherit the mix-up
heritage of Portugal and Malay marks their presence while
the groups of Indian Baba or Melaka Chitty absorbed local
Malay culture in their Hindu cultural practices and created a
unique cultural form.
It is well known that Malay culture in Melaka provides his-
torical and cultural foundation for the formation of Malayness
in modern times. Relationships between rulers and common
people and the model of Melaka Sultanate have been reference
points for the construction of Malay identity. Melaka Sultan’s
charter displays how the unique historical experiences of
Melaka at that time have been transmitted up to now. But in
a historical viewpoint, Malay culture, although it is often said
to be formed under the influence of traditional political struc-
tures of Sultanates and stably carry homogeneous characteris-
tic, its formation has been going through interactions and
dramatic changes up until now. Malayness is not an end-
product but an open-ended and processual one. Especially
given that tourism policies under the support of the Malaysian
government and the Melaka local government as well have
exerted an important influence on the cultural positioning of
various ethnic groups in Melaka, their ethnic identities have
been adapting to new cultural conditions. These cultural set-
tings should be considered as critical factors on the state of cul-
tural hybridity in Melaka.
What Melaka’s culture and history inspire above all in the
modern form of urban culture is that multicultural coexistence
and tolerance were in full bloom. Melaka as an intermediary
port has connected the Indian Ocean and the South China
Sea in the network of the East Asian Sea Silk Road and
migrants and merchants enjoyed the openness of Melaka and
interacted with other people. This environment produced a dis-
tinctive urban culture. Under Western colonial rules, Melaka
underwent transformation with diverse cultural colors, mixing
various ethnic groups. Eventually ‘‘Melakaness” or ‘‘Cara
Melaka”, a unique frontier identity, became invented.
Concluding remarks
The view of ‘‘the sea as common to all” (Lockard, 2010: 219;
Sutherland, 2007: 27) has been evidenced in the East Asian
maritime world where merchants, traders, sailors, and coastal
peoples have enjoyed the openness of the sea. Port cities like
Melaka played a crucial role in fostering the maritime trade
of this world and creating intimate trade networks as a result.
Long before the era of Western dominance, Asian merchants
including Chinese had linked port cities and their hinterlands
to the hemispheric trade nexus. They served as fields ofeconomic exchange as well as cosmopolitan gateways for the
import and export of people, goods, and ideas (Lockard,
2010: 245).
In this sense, the cultural scape of Melaka can be under-
stood from a viewpoint that accounts for the lifestyle pattern
of Orang Laut (sea people/sea gypsies/seafarers). Then we
can come up with an entirely original set of understanding
Melaka that highlights notions of mobility, unbounded space,
multiple places, and seafaring networks. In the similar vein, it
is important to look at Melaka and its trade networks beyond
national and geopolitical boundaries that restrict our geo-
graphical imagination. Indeed, recent processes of intense eco-
nomic, social and spatial integration across Southeast Asia
demand us to develop a fresh framework of analysis that can
deal with social phenomena such as cultural hybridity,
transnationalism, diaspora cultures, multiple identities, cross-
border networks and flows, and porous liquid boundaries.
The term of ’a golden age’ that describes the heyday of
Melaka has been proven as a crucial material whereby
Malaysia has attempted to construct a national Malay-
focused identity and also promote tourism. State-driven cul-
tural policies during the 1970s and 1980s appealed to the pri-
mordial politico-religious traditions of a pre-colonial, feudal
Muslims sultanate in conceiving the identity of the modern
Malaysian nation and displayed in this fashion Melaka’s her-
itage to Malaysian visitors as well as international tourists.
Melaka was appropriated as ’a symbol for the nation’ and as
’the creator of the values and norms of a wider notion of
Malayness’ based on an idealized and pure form of Islam
stripped of any magical, pre-Islamic elements.
However, it was not without problems because the concrete
evidences of its importance as the early center of Islam and
Malayness such as buildings and material culture had disap-
peared and became replaced by European (Portuguese, Dutch,
and British) colonial buildings and Chinese shops. Melaka’s
application for a UNESCO World Heritage Site in the late
1980s was rejected because the waterfront area and historic
harbor had been destroyed by reclamation projects and recon-
structed in an attempt to present what the state thought
Melaka should have been and ought to be. Another applica-
tion submission in the late 1990s met with criticism because
non-Malay traditions, marked in the urban landscape and
architecture, notably those of the Chinese and particularly
the hybrid Baba Nyonya or Straits-born Chinese, were
neglected in official, state-sponsored representations.
Indeed, it is problematic that ’feudal’ Melaka, with its
reconstructed wooden sultan’s palace, the Historic City
Memorial Garden in Islamic design, and the Cultural Museum
with its emphasis on traditional court ritual and ceremony,
and as the repository of a long-established indigenous culture
and the political traditions of kingdom, represents a moderniz-
ing multi-ethnic Malaysian nation and especially the aspira-
tions of a rapidly expanding Malay middle class.
Interestingly Malaysia in the 1990s began to move away from
retrospective Malay identity to a future-oriented one where
Kuala Lumpur as the capital of the country was employed
as a symbol of a full-fledging industrial country that would
be aimed to come true by the year 2020 (Watson, 1996).
Recent representations of Melaka also emphasize a more mod-
ernized, commercialized leisure and recreation center
(Hitchcock and King, 2003: 6–7).
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from location to location. Melaka has focused on Malay cul-
ture, especially in the midst of the emergence of the nation-
state and its representation. It has been contentious that the
cultural representation of Chinese, Indian and Orang Asli
has been neglected in its Malay-centeredness. This process,
which reflects political, economic and ethnic dominance, is
easily hidden behind the inconspicuous label of cultural vil-
lages or cultural theme parks (Hoffstaedter, 2008: 156).
In conclusion, I emphasize that it is possible to apply the
notion of Zomia to the explanation of the social formations
of maritime or watery frontier societies in Southeast Asia
including Malaysia. I say yes. It is the reason why Melaka
was one of the most important waterly frontier societies in
Southeast Asian maritime world. As I mentioned above, I
reemphasize that it can have relevancy in dealing with mar-
itime or watery frontier societies which have experienced the
historical and social dynamics of multi-lingual, multi-ethnic,
multi-cultural formations. Port cities have represented mar-
itime frontiers and connected the ocean and the inland. In this
regard, Melaka as a seaport has been a hub of waterly frontier
societies. Melaka as a bridge of maritime networks, had an
important role to connect with the sea and the land. In other
words, it can be concluded that waterly frontier has been not
only an open space to exchange multiple cultures and histories,
but also a zone of state-avoidance in Southeast Asian maritime
world. From historical and cultural point of view, it can be
said that Melaka has been one of the most important and
meaningful waterly frontier societies in Southeast Asian mar-
itime world.
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